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Abstract
We show how an off-path (spoofing-only) attacker can
perform cross-site scripting (XSS), cross-site request
forgery (CSRF) and site spoofing/defacement attacks,
without requiring vulnerabilities in either web-browser
or server and circumventing known defenses. Attacker
can also launch devastating denial of service (DoS) at-
tacks, even when the connection between the client and
the server is secured with SSL/TLS. The attacks are prac-
tical and require a puppet (malicious script in browser
sandbox) running on a the victim client machine, and at-
tacker capable of IP-spoofing on the Internet.
Our attacks use a technique allowing an off-path at-
tacker to learn the sequence numbers of both client and
server in a TCP connection. The technique exploits the
fact that many computers, in particular those running
Windows, use a global IP-ID counter, which provides a
side channel allowing efficient exposure of the connec-
tion sequence numbers.
We present results of experiments evaluating the learn-
ing technique and the attacks that exploit it. Finally, we
present practical defenses that can be deployed at the fire-
wall level; no changes to existing TCP/IP stacks are re-
quired.
1 Introduction
TCP is the main transport protocol over the Internet,
ensuring reliable and efficient connections. TCP was
not designed to be secure against Man-in-the-Middle
(MitM); in fact, it is trivially vulnerable to MitM attacks.
However, it seems that man-in-the-middle and eaves-
dropping attacks are relatively rare in practice, since they
require the attacker to control routers or links along the
path between the victims. Instead, most practical attacks
involve malicious hosts, without MitM capabilities, i.e.,
the attackers are off-path.
In our attacks, as well as in many other off-path attacks
(e.g., SYN-flood [42], DNS-poisoning [22]), the attacker
sends spoofed packets, i.e., packets with fake (spoofed)
sender IP address. Due to ingress filtering [24, 15, 5] and
other anti-spoofing measures, IP spoofing is less com-
monly available than before, but still feasible, see [2, 14].
Apparently, there is still a significant number of ISPs that
do not perform ingress filtering for their clients (espe-
cially to multihomed customers). Furthermore, with the
growing concern of cyberwarfare and cybercrime, some
ISPs may intentionally support spoofing. Hence, it is still
reasonable to assume spoofing ability.
However, there is a widespread belief that an ‘off-
path’ spoofing attacker, cannot inject traffic into a TCP
connection. The reasoning is that an incoming TCP
packet must contain valid sequence number (or be dis-
carded); the sequence number field is 32 bits long and
initialized using randomness, therefore, it seems unlikely
that an attacker can efficiently generate a spoofed packet
which will be accepted by the recipient, i.e., inject data
into the TCP stream.
This belief is also stated in RFCs and standards, e.g.,
in RFC 4953, discussing on TCP spoofing attacks (see
[42], Section 2.2). Indeed, since its early days, most In-
ternet traffic uses TCP - and is not cryptographically pro-
tected, in spite of warnings, e.g., by Morris [33], Bellovin
[8, 10]).
Of course, TCP injections are easy, for implementa-
tions using predictable initial sequence numbers (ISNs).
This was observed already by Morris at 1985 [33] and
abused by Mitnick [38]. Later, at 2001, Zalewski
found that most implementations still used predictable
sequence numbers [46].
However, by now, most or all major implementations
ensure sufficiently-unpredictable initial sequence num-
bers, e.g., following [19, 20]. Does this imply that TCP
injections are infeasible?
Zalewski [48] suggested that it may be possible to
spoof a non-first fragment of a (fragmented) TCP packet,
when the values of the fragment IP-IDs are predictable.
In particular, existing implementations of Windows use
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globally-incrementing IP-ID values, which are easy to
predict. Zalewski’s attack may also be applicable to
Linux, using the IP-ID prediction techniques in [17].
However, exploiting such non-first-fragment TCP in-
jections seems challenging; furthermore, currently al-
most all TCP implementations use path MTU discovery
[32, 31] and avoid fragmentation completely. Hence, Za-
lewski’s attack (on TCP) will rarely work in practice.
Yet, we show that TCP injections are still possible.
We present an efficient, practical technique, based on
globally-incrementing IP-ID, allowing an off-path adver-
sary, Mallory, to inject data into a TCP connection be-
tween two communicating peers: a client C and a server
S. The attack is not immediate, and requires a connection
lasting a few dozens of seconds. We present experimen-
tal results, showing that our techniques allow efficient,
practical TCP injections. Furthermore, we show, that the
attacks have significant potential for abuse. Specifically,
we show how our TCP injection techniques, allow both
circumvention of the Same Origin Policy [6, 49] and dev-
astating DoS attacks. Details follow.
Our TCP injection technique is related to a proposal
for TCP injection, by klm [27]. The technique described
by klm had some limitations, e.g., it did not work for
clients connected by a firewall. More significantly, klm
did not present experimental results; our experiments
show that their technique, even with some improvements,
results in low injection success rates, unless the attacker
has low latency to the victim (as when they are on the
same LAN). Our techniques avoid this limitation. We
provide a detailed comparison between our technique to
[27] in appendix A.
Like [48, 17, 27], our technique is based on the pre-
dictability of the IP-ID (e.g., in Windows); however, in-
stead of using the predictable IP-ID to intercept or mod-
ify fragmented packets, as in [48, 17], we use the changes
in the IP-ID as a side channel. We use this side-channel
to allow the attacker to detect difference in responses for
crafted probe packets that she sends to the client; our im-
plementation uses specific probes, but others may exist.
Previous works noted that the predictable IP-ID can
be used as a side channel, allowing an attacker to use one
connection to learn about events in another connection,
which is undesirable. Gont [18] mentions several ways
in which the side channel based on globally-incremented
IP-ID can be abused. However, their impact is modest.
In particular, the side-channel can be used to perform the
idle (stealth) scan attack [47, 26, 29], and to count the
number of machines behind NAT [9].
However, vendors continued using globally-
incrementing IP-ID values, even after we presented
our initial TCP injection results to them, and being
aware of the previous attacks exploiting the globally
incrementing IP-IDs. Their justification is that they be-
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Figure 1: Network Model. C enters www.mallory.com,
the adversarial web page. A script on that page forms a
connection with www.s.com.
lieved that such attacks are impractical and too complex
to be exploited in practice. They confirmed our results
and agreed that they are feasible; they will address the
problem in new releases.
We believe that this response is ‘too little, too late’,
and that it is critical for the community to be aware of the
threat and apply mitigations (Section 7). A more contro-
versial conclusion is the need to apply more prudent ap-
proach to network security vulnerabilities, and respond
to early indications of weakness, without waiting for a
complete exploit; see discussion in Section 8.
Much of our work focused on analyzing what are the
practical implications of the TCP injection. We study
two approaches to exploit TCP injections: to circumvent
address based server authentication, usually referred to
as Same Origin Policy (SOP) [6, 49]; and to launch a De-
nial of Service (DoS) attack. We discuss each of these
briefly in separate subsections below, and in depth in
Sections 2 and 3. All attacks are based on the same at-
tacker and network assumptions which we now describe.
Attacker Capabilities and Network Model
All our attacks work in the same settings: an off-path,
IP-spoofing attacker. We also assume that the attacker is
able to control some puppets [4], i.e., scripts, applets or
other restricted (sandboxed) programs, running on client
machines accessing an adversarial web site. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 1 where C enters a site controlled by
the adversary, Mallory. This allows Mallory to run a ma-
licious script within C’s browser sandbox. The script al-
lows Mallory to (1) form the connection between C and
S, and (2) probe C’s connection with S and avoid firewall
filtering. The first allows Mallory to choose the victim
server (S), we show how the second allows exposure of
the TCP connection’s four tuple.
As mentioned above, our attacks require that the con-
nection from C and S will not be short; since Mallory
forms this connection (using the puppet), she can ensure
that it does not terminate by sending periodic requests
to the server. In persistent HTTP connections, all re-
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quests are over the same (victim) connection and ensure
it does not close. Persistent HTTP connections are the
default configuration of apache servers and are also em-
ployed by many large web-servers (e.g., Facebook, Ya-
hoo!, Google), but not all (e.g., live.com, the Japanese
version of Yahoo!). Our attacks are browser independent,
as we illustrate in experiments in the following sections.
1.1 Breaking SOP and Address-Based Au-
thentication
TCP injection attacks were key to some of the most
well known exploits, specifically, attacks against address
based client authentication, e.g., see [38, 10]. How-
ever, as a result, address-based client authentication has
become essentially obsolete, and mostly replaced with
secure alternatives such as SSH and SSL/TLS. We be-
lieve that the only widely-deployed use of address based
client authentication, is to identify clients involved in
DoS attacks such as SYN flooding; and this threat can
be dealt with by simple client-response authentication,
possibly using cookies to avoid state-exhaustion on the
server [13].
However, current web security still relies, to large ex-
tent, on the Same Origin Policy [6, 49], i.e., on address
based server authentication; our results show that rely-
ing on addresses to authenticate the servers is also risky.
Using TCP injections to attack address based server
authentication, e.g., to perform XSS attacks, is more
challenging than using it to attack address based client
authentication. In attacks on address based client au-
thentication, the off-path attacker sends the initial SYN
to open a new connection; hence, she knows the client’s
sequence number, as well as the source and destination
IP addresses and ports; she ‘only’ needs to predict the
server’s sequence number. In contrast, to attack address
based server authentication, the off-path attacker must
guess both sequence numbers, as well as the IP addresses
and ports of both parties; guessing the client port could
also be challenging, as the client may choose it arbitrar-
ily.
To circumvent the same origin policy [6, 49], the off-
path attacker sends forged responses for requests that C
sends to another server S. This attack is facilitated in two
phases: first the puppet opens a connection to the victim
server, allowing TCP injection into this connection; then
the puppet requests an object, allowing the attacker to
send the script in a (spoofed) response.
In particular, this allows powerful cross site scripting
(XSS). XSS is one of the most critical attacks on web
security, however, current XSS techniques depend on
implementation vulnerabilities, usually of the site (e.g.,
[45, 49]), and sometimes of the browser [25]. In con-
trast to typical XSS attacks, our attack does not rely on
a server side or browser vulnerability. Moreover, since
Mallory can choose the server S, any persistent HTTP
connection between C and a server is vulnerable (see
above). Connections with HTTPS servers are not vul-
nerable to XSS since Mallory cannot inject content into
the cryptographically sealed session.
Furthermore, the XSS ability allows injection of re-
quests, i.e., cross-site request forgery (CSRF) [41]. This
circumvents existing defenses, such as the use of cook-
ies, referrer header and hidden field, since all of these are
available to the (injected) script (see [34]). The CSRF
attack can be prevented by challenge response methods
that require user involvement, such as password authen-
tication or CAPTCHAs.
The XSS ability also allows advanced phishing at-
tacks. In particular, this provides efficient means for de-
tection of browsing history, more effectively than previ-
ous techniques, e.g., [28, 44].
1.2 Devastating DoS attacks
An off-path attacker can use the knowledge of TCP pa-
rameters (IPs, ports and sequence numbers) in several
ways, to attack the availability of a communication ser-
vice.
In 2004, Watson observed that BGP connections used
a constant client port, and typically have very large win-
dows; this makes it feasible for an off-path adversary
to reset BGP connections [43] (despite random initial
sequence numbers). However, appropriate countermea-
sures make this attack inapplicable today [13].
We show how a spoofing, off-path attacker, who con-
trols a limited number of (weak) puppets, can deploy
formidable DoS attacks, which so far were known to re-
quire stronger attacker capabilities: the Ack-Storm attack
[1] and the Optimistic-Ack attack [37]. Both are DDoS
attacks, which use TCP control plane to generate excess
amount of traffic. The Ack-Storm attack [1], is usually
performed by MitM adversaries, possibly with limited
eavesdropping abilities. The Optimistic-Ack attack [37]
typically requires client cooperation (zombie) and per-
suades the server to send data in a high capacity, more
than that allowed by C’s link. Since in both these at-
tacks, Mallory injects data only to the TCP layer (and
not to the application), these attacks also work when the
victim servers use SSL.
Launching these attacks simultaneously on multiple
client-server pairs may allow Mallory to conduct an im-
proved variant of the Coremelt attack [40] and congest a
core link of the Internet, using only puppets.
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1.3 Organization
The next two sections focus on the application of the
TCP injection technique. In Section 2 we present our
off-path attacks on the confidentiality and integrity (au-
thentication) of the communication between client and
server, including the XSS, CSRF and phishing attacks.
In Section 3, we present our off-path DDoS attacks.
Sections 4-6 present the TCP injection technique it-
self. Section 4 presents the first step, which is expos-
ing the server’s sequence number. Section 5 continues
the attack, to expose the client’s sequence number as
well. Section 6 discusses deployment challenges, im-
provements to meet these challenges, and experimental
results.
Finally, Section 7 proposes defenses against the at-
tacks, and Section 8 presents a concluding discussion.
2 Off-Path Data Integrity Attacks
In this and the following section we present and em-
pirically evaluate exploits of TCP injections. We focus
on long-lived-connection injection attacks, where an off-
path attacker learns the sequence numbers of an existing,
long-lived TCP connection, between a given TCP client
and server (identified by their IP addresses and ports).
Motivated by these exploits, in Sections 4-6 we present
and evaluate the technique we employ to study the se-
quence numbers.
Specifically, we show critical exploits of long-lived
connection injections. In this section we focus on two
exploits: the first allows an off-path attacker to run a ma-
licious script in the context of an arbitrary website of the
attacker’s choice, without depending on a vulnerability
of the server (e.g., bug in input sanitization) or of the
browser; this is a new, devastating type of XSS attack
[45, 25]. The second exploit allows the same attacker
to present spoofed web-pages for clients. In the follow-
ing section we show how off-path attackers can use long-
lived connection injections to cause devastating DoS at-
tacks. All exploits work in the same setting, illustrated
in Figure 1.
2.1 Identifying the Victim Connection
To launch the long-lived-connection injection attacks,
the attacker must identify a connection between the client
and server which is defined by the IP addresses and ports
of the participating peers.
The exploits use the puppet running on the client to
open such (long-lived) connections. The server’s IP and
port are, of course, known. To find the client’s IP and
port, the puppet opens another TCP connection to the
attacker and over it, sends packets to the attacker’s ma-
chine. These packets contain the client’s IP address.
The final challenge is to detect the client port. Many
clients, in particular, those running one of the Windows
family operating systems, assign ports to connections in-
crementally. We use the puppet to open a connection to
the attacker’s remote site before and after opening the
connection to the victim server, incremental port assign-
ment allows the attacker to learn the client’s port; see
step A in the attack process described in Section 2.2.1
below. Client port exposing may fail if the puppet com-
municates with the server or attacker via a NAT device
that randomizes the client port (since ‘external’ ports are
not incremental). In an ongoing research we investigate
this problem and provide, details of a different technique
that allows an off-path attacker to detect the client port in
a connection.
It remains to describe, in the following subsections,
the unique aspects to each of the exploits and evaluate
their impact.
2.2 Off-Path Injection XSS (or: XSS of the
Fourth Kind)
In a Cross-site scripting (XSS) attack, the attacker causes
the browser to run malicious, attacker-provided script (or
other sandboxed code), with the permissions of scripts
within a victim server web-page.
In [25], Klein identifies three kinds of XSS attacks. In
persistent/stored XSS attack, the script is received from
the victim server, as part of the contents of a page stored
by the victim server. In reflection XSS attack, the script
is ‘reflected’ by the victim server to the client, after the
server receives the script from the browser (typically vis-
iting a malicious website). Finally, in a DOM-based XSS
attack, the script is received by the browser directly from
the attacking server; a browser vulnerability (bug) causes
the browser to consider the script as coming from some
other victim server.
Both reflection and persistent/stored XSS attacks, ex-
ploit ‘bugs’ in the web application. Well designed sites,
using appropriate defenses such as Web Application
Firewalls (WAF), should eliminate these attacks; see,
e.g., [45]. DOM-based XSS attacks do not require any
bug in the site, but depend on bugs in the browser; the
relevant known bugs were quickly patched by browser
vendors.
Long-lived-connection injection attacks, allow a new,
fourth kind of XSS attacks: off-path injection XSS at-
tacks. In these attacks, the malicious script is sent by the
attacker to the browser, with (spoofed) source IP address
of the victim server. If the script it injected correctly,
with correct TCP/IP parameters and within correct HTTP
context, then the browser executes it in the context of the
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victim site.
2.2.1 Attack Process
We next explain the technique we employ to use long-
lived injection attacks to perform off-path XSS injec-
tions. Like our other exploits, we assume that the user
visits a website controlled by the attacker from where
he receives and executes a puppet (malicious script) [4].
The attack has five steps and proceeds as follows:
A. Form Connection, Expose Client Port
Puppet opens a new connection to a server controlled by
the attacker, then a connection to the victim web server
and finally another new connection to a server controlled
by the attacker. Let the client port numbers that the at-
tacker observes for the first and third connections be p1,
p3. We use the counter property of Windows port as-
signment: if p3 = p1 +2, then we assume that the client
used port p1+1 for the (middle) connection to the victim
server. Otherwise, repeat.
B. Expose Connection Sequence Numbers
Puppet maintains the connection with the victim server
alive by sending periodic requests for small objects. Dur-
ing this time, attacker runs the sequence exposure attack
described in Sections 4, 5. If sequence exposing fails,
restart entire attack.
C. Send ‘Dummy’ Request
Puppet sends the victim server a request for some web
page (over the same persistent connection), e.g., using
an iframe, and informs the attacker on that request. Note
that the puppet runs in the context of the attacker site;
hence, the attacker and puppet can communicate and co-
ordinate the attack without restrictions.
D. Send Spoofed Response
Attacker sends spoofed response to the client, containing
exact expected TCP parameters, and a web page contain-
ing the malicious script.
E. Script Execution
Browser receives the spoofed response as if it was sent
by victim server, hence, executes script with permissions
of the victim server. Figure 2 shows a successful run of
this attack on the Mozilla Firefox browser.
2.2.2 CSRF Exploit
As indicated in [45, 41], once attackers succeed in an
XSS attack, i.e., run a malicious script in the browser, in
the context of a victim site, they can exploit it in many
ways. In particular, such XSS attack allows attackers to
send a forged (fake) request to the server on the user’s
behalf, i.e., a cross site request forgery (CSRF) attack,
Figure 2: An XSS Attack. Mallory runs a script in
context of www.victim–server.com within Mozilla Fire-
fox sandbox. The address bar indicates the user is at
www.mallory.com, but the message box context indica-
tion shows that the script (that Mallory provided) runs
from www.victim–server.com.
circumventing all known defenses against CSRF attacks
for non-secured connections, except for (few) defenses
requiring extra user efforts for submission of each (sen-
sitive) request; see [34].
Note that since the attackers (cross site) scrips can read
the entire response that the user receives from the vic-
tim web-server, they would even be able to circumvent
advanced proposed defenses, which require new browser
mechanisms. In particular, they can foil the origin header
proposed by Barth et al. against CSRF attacks [7], as
well as policy-based defense mechanisms against XSS,
e.g., Content Security Policy (CSP) [21, 39].
2.3 Experimental validation
In this subsection we evaluate the applicability of the
XSS attack on web-users. The client machine in the fol-
lowing experiments is protected by Windows Firewall.
The success of the XSS attack depends on success-
fully exposing of the sequence numbers used in the con-
nection the client has with the victim server. The success
rate of the exposure technique that we employ (presented
in Sections 4, 5) depends on the rate of packets that the
client machine sends. In Section 6 we present another
set of experiments that specifically evaluates the injec-
tion technique for different environments. In the mea-
surements below, C sends 32 packets per second on av-
erage.
We tested whether connections with each of the top
1024 sites in Alexa ranking [3] are vulnerable to off-
path XSS attacks: our client machine connects to the at-
tacker (www.mallory.com), who then tries to run a script
in context of one of the top sites. The script provides
an indication of a successful injection by requesting an
image from www.mallory.com. Note that our attacker
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only communicates with the client, and does not have
any interaction with the victim servers. In Figure 3 we
compare the results for three common browsers and ob-
serve that the attack is not browser-dependent. The im-
mune connections are generally of the following types:
(1) secured with SSL (HTTPS), this prevents the attacker
from injecting his script to the connection (step D in the
attack); (2) sites that do not use the HTTP keep alive
option, this prevents the attacker from keeping the long
connection with the server that is required to expose the
sequence numbers (step B in the attack). In Figure 4
we provide distribution of the top 1024 sites in Alexa
ranking; showing that 80% percent of them appear vul-
nerable (line 3 in Figure 4). A comparison of this result
to those presented in Figure 3 shows that the XSS at-
tack was, in fact, successful on roughly 75% of the sites
that appear vulnerable. Among the vulnerable sites on
which we ran a successful attack are www.facebook.com,
www.yahoo.com and www.amazon.com.
2.4 Web Spoofing/Phishing/Defacement
In addition to the XSS exploits, attackers can use TCP in-
jections to perform web spoofing (which is key to phish-
ing attacks). Namely, the attacker waits for the user to
browse to some victim server, e.g., http://www.bank.com,
and injects his data to the connection. In this attack, the
attacker provides a spoofed version of the web-page to
the client. This spoofing exploit can expose sensitive
user-provided information such as passwords and may
trick the user to download malware. An implicit as-
sumption of this attack is that the initial web-page that
the user receives, and which the attacker forges, i.e.,
http://www.bank.com, is not protected by SSL. This is
the situation in most sites, which do not use SSL/TLS at
all.
The attack also works for many sites which do use
SSL/TLS, but only via a link, e.g, to the login page
https://www.bank.com/login.php. This approach is com-
mon since it reduces the load on the server by delay-
ing setup of SSL connections until these are required
(in the banking example, for login); see line 4 of Figure
41. Web-spoofing can allow the attacker to circumvent
the use of encrypted connections (SSL/TLS), using tech-
niques/tools such as SSL-strip [30], i.e., replace links on
the original page to phony pages (on the attacker’s site).
To succeed in a web-spoofing attack, the attacker
would best send the spoofed page as a response to a re-
quest made by the user (since then the page appears au-
thentic to the user); hence, the attacker should be able
to detect the request for the page and send a response.
We solve this problem by having the puppet open a con-
nection to the victim server in advance providing suffi-
cient time to expose the sequence numbers used in the
connection. We leave the connection open (by sending
‘dummy’ requests periodically); and probe for user activ-
ity by identifying a change in the client’s sequence num-
ber. In order to detect this change that indicates that the
client had sent a request to the server, the attacker peri-
odically conducts a client-seq-test; this test is a building
block of the sequence numbers exposing technique and
we provide its details in Section 5. Briefly, the test allows
the attacker to test whether the client sequence number is
above some value; testing using the exposed (i.e., last
known) value of client sequence number allows to detect
such change. Once we detect such activity over the con-
nection, we assume that the user had sent a request to the
server for the home page and send a spoofed (modified)
page.
This web spoofing technique assumes that the user
opens the page for the victim-server while the puppet is
still running, e.g., in a different tab of the same browser
or in a zero-size iframe. Furthermore, it assumes that the
browser employs connection sharing between different
tabs, i.e., one TCP connection is used to communicate
with the same server via several tabs of the browser. TCP
connection sharing is employed by the current versions
of Internet Explorer, Firefox and Chrome (and possibly
other browsers).
1Line 4 of Figure 4 counts sites which have persistent connections,
to both http and https. Note that some of these sites may not often
use https, while others may use https but in a different domain.
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Figure 5: Web Spoofing/Defacement Attack. Mallory
waits for the user to enter J.P. Morgan bank website,
when he enters he injects a phony page. In this figure
Mallory added a devil image.
Another assumption is that the user receives the at-
tacker’s response before the server’s; this appears as a
race that would be difficult to win for an attacker far
from the client machine. However, the attacker can avoid
this race by injecting data to the client (as the server) in
advance: the injected data artificially increments the se-
quence number that the client expects from the server
while the true server would still use the ‘normal’ se-
quence number, causing the client to reject all data sent
by the server.
2.4.1 Example: Spoofing J.P. Morgan
The J.P. Morgan bank website is an example of a sen-
sitive site that is vulnerable to this spoofing/phishing at-
tack; it uses HTTP keep alive option and its homepage
is not protected by SSL. Hence, this website is vulner-
able to the web spoofing attack above. Figure 5 shows
the result of a successful web spoofing attempt: here the
client has two tabs open in his browser. The current tab
(in focus) shows the J.P. Morgan homepage that Mallory
provided; the devil image (that does not exist in the orig-
inal page) indicates that this page is spoofed. J.P. Mor-
gan homepage contains a client log-on link that in the
original site switches to SSL. In the spoofed version, the
link is to a web-page in Mallory’s site. In the other tab,
the victim is in www.mallory.com; this allows Mallory to
monitor the requests that the user (may) send J.P. Morgan
and identify the correct time to inject the spoofed page.
3 Off-Path Denial-of-Service by Puppets
We next describe possible exploits of long-lived-
connection injection attacks to disrupt network commu-
nication. Namely, we show how attackers can build on
these attacks, to launch devastating Distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attacks. As before, we consider an
off-path IP-spoofing attacker, who also controls a sig-
nificant number of ‘puppets’, i.e., scripts running in
browsers of unsuspecting users. As argued in [4], it is
relatively easy for attackers to control a large number of
puppets in this way.
However, puppets have limited ability to launch
DDoS attacks. One reason are limitations placed by
the browsers on the number of concurrent connections
opened by the same web-page. Another reason is that,
due to their execution within a sandbox, puppets can only
use standard TCP connections. In particular, if the at-
tack succeeds in causing congestion and loss, then TCP
connections, including those of the puppets, will signif-
icantly reduce their window size (and hence their traffic
rates). Therefore, while puppets can be used for DDoS
attacks, their impact is much less than that of ‘regular’
malware (zombies/bots).
In contrast to the data integrity attacks in the previ-
ous section, the attacks below use TCP control plane to
cause congestion. Since there is no attempt to inject data
to the application layer, even SSL/TLS protected sites are
vulnerable. Hence, these attacks are applicable to web-
sites that support persistent HTTP connections, with or
without SSL/TLS, e.g., to about 80% of the 1000 most
popular sites (see line 2 in Figure 4).
3.1 Off-Path Optimistic Ack Attack
We first describe Off-path Optimistic Ack; this is a vari-
ant of the Optimistic Ack DoS attack [37]. These at-
tacks cheat TCP’s congestion control mechanism, caus-
ing senders to believe that most of the data they sent was
already received, and hence that they can send more data
(congestion window is not full), and also to increase the
size of the congestion window. This can result in huge
amplification factors, see [37], unless servers use per-
connection bandwidth quotas or use other defenses.
In both Optimistic Ack attacks (ours and the original
[37]), the attacker sends to the server acknowledgment
packets (Acks), as if the client received all packets sent
by the server (although packets are still in transit or even
lost). As a result, the server continues sending informa-
tion, with increasing window sizes (and hence rates).
In the original attack [37], the client must run mal-
ware, with ability to send ‘raw IP’ packets (i.e., not ac-
cording to the TCP specifications). This is a significant
requirement; recent operating systems make it harder for
malware to obtain such ability. Furthermore, the original
attack may be blocked by a firewall on the client side,
by detecting the unusual high rate. Note that since by
requiring only puppets, attacker is more likely to control
enough clients to succeed in the attack, in spite of coun-
termeasures such as per-connection quotas.
Our long-lived-connection injection attack, allows an
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off-path attacker to perform an off-path variant of the Op-
timistic Ack attack, as follows. The attacker only needs
a puppet on the client machine to open the TCP con-
nection with the victim server and learn the client port
and sequence numbers. Following this, the puppet re-
quests some large object from the server and is no longer
needed; the attacker sends Ack packets as done by the
client in the original attack, and - if not using SSL/TLS -
the attacker can even send new request(s) if needed. Note
that even if the client’s firewall (detects the attack or for
some other reason) begins blocking packets on this con-
nection from both directions, this does not help since we
provide the Acks to the server from the off-path attacker.
Furthermore, RFC-compliant RST packets that the fire-
wall (or client) may send, would be out of the server’s
window and hence ignored, and would not tear the con-
nection. Server-induced verifications, by intentionally
dropping or reordering packets periodically, as suggested
in [37], seem one of the best (or only) defenses.
3.2 Off-Path Ack-Storm DoS Attack
In the original Ack-Storm DoS attack [1], the attacker
needs to have some (limited) ability to eavesdrop on
packets. From these packets, the attacker learns the TCP
parameters (IP addresses, ports, and sequence numbers).
Using these, the attacker sends two spoofed data packets,
one to each of the two ends of the connection. According
to the TCP specification, and in most TCP implementa-
tions, upon receiving an Ack for data that was not yet
sent, TCP sends back a ‘duplicate Ack’ - i.e., resends the
previously sent Ack. As a result of receiving the pair of
spoofed data packets, one at each peer, both peers begin
sending acknowledgment packets to each other. Since
these Acks acknowledge data which was actually sent by
the attacker, not by the peer, then each of these Acks will
only result in another duplicate Ack returned, and this
process will continue indefinitely.
The attacker can send additional data packets to the
peers, causing additional ping-pong exchanges, quickly
filling-up the channel capacity. This causes increased
load on the networks; the fact that the packets involved
in the attack are very short (just Acks), makes the load on
routers and switches even higher. Eventually, this causes
packet losses, and legitimate TCP connections sharing
the same links significantly reduce their rate.
The off-path Ack-Storm DoS Attack works exactly
like the regular Ack-Storm DoS Attack, except for us-
ing the long-lived connection injection technique to al-
low the off-path attacker to learn the TCP parameters.
Hence the attacker can run this attack, without requiring
the ability to eavesdrop.
3.3 Off-path Coremelt Attack
Since the two DoS attacks described above can be
launched using only puppets, it follows that even rela-
tively weak attackers may be able to cause large amounts
of traffic from many clients spread around the network.
This can cause high load on servers, routers and links.
In particular, by choosing well the pairs of clients and
servers between which the attacks are launched, the at-
tackers can cause huge amounts of traffic to flow over
specific ‘victim’ backbone routers and links. These back-
bone networks, connecting large core ISPs (autonomous
systems), have very high capacities; by sending enough
traffic to a particular destination, attacker can cause
queuing and losses in the connecting router. As a result,
Internet connectivity may break - first for TCP connec-
tions and then even for UDP applications. We use the
term Off-path Coremelt Attack for the resulting attack on
core Internet connectivity, since it is an off-path variant
of the Coremelt attack [40]. The Coremelt attack uses
a large botnet, sending large amounts of traffic between
pairs of the bots, with the pairs chosen intentionally so
that huge amounts of traffic will flow over specific vic-
tim link/router. As shown by simulations in [40], this
can result in congesting the victim link/router, and even
in breaking connectivity in the Network.
In the Off-path Coremelt attack, the attacker will also
congest a core link; however, instead of depending on
pairs of zombies (bots), here the attack just requires a
puppet at one end. The other end of the connection is
a legitimate server, and to cause huge amounts of traf-
fic, the attacker uses one of the two off-path DoS attacks
described above.
This attack has three advantages compared to the orig-
inal Coremelt attack: (1) controlling a sufficiently large
and correctly-dispersed set of puppets is easier than con-
trolling a comparable set of zombies; (2) we only need to
control one end of each connection (the puppet), not both
ends; and (3) since we use adversary-chosen servers,
these can have very high bandwidth, higher than avail-
able to most bots.
3.4 Experimental Evaluation
We used the topology illustrated in Figure 6 to test the
off-path denial of service attacks we presented. In our
tests we assume that Mallory runs a puppet on C and can
inject data to the TCP connection between C and S (a
connection that Mallory caused C to establish).
We evaluate the attacks by measuring the degradation
of service that they cause to other legitimate connections.
We consider different round-trip times (RTTs) for the le-
gitimate connections we measure: the longer the RTT is,
the greater the congestion windows are. Since every loss
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halves the congestion window, a more significant effect
is observed when RTT is high. Furthermore, a higher
RTT implies that it will take more time for the sender
to detect a packet loss and retransmit. The base line to
which we compare the effect of these attacks is line 1 in
Figure 7 which illustrates the time it takes C* to receive
a 50MB file from S* under normal conditions.
S 
(victim server)
C 
(runs puppet)
Mallory
Opt-Ack or 
Ack-Storm?
C*
10
10 100
100
1
S*
Figure 6: Network environment for testing the DoS at-
tacks. Each link specifies its capacity in mbps.
3.4.1 Off-Path Optimistic Ack Evaluation
In this attack we aimed to clog the S’s link: Mallory uses
C to request some large file from S and then performs
the Optimistic Ack attack, persuading S to send data to
C at high a rate. We evaluated the effect of this attack by
measuring the degradation of service in a connection that
S has with some other client C* who tries to download
a 50MB file. Lines 1 and 2 in Figure 7 illustrate our
results. Notice the significant difference in attacker and
server link capacities; the amplification ratio measured
in this attack is 78 (for every byte that Mallory sends, S
sends approximately 78 bytes). Furthermore, the attack
also clogs C’s link, as shown by line 4.
3.4.2 Off-Path Ack-Storm Evaluation
We use the Ack-Storm attack to congest C’s link and
measure the effect on a different connection that he has
with some other server S*. In order to congest the link,
Mallory creates a new Ack ‘ping-pong’ every 100 ms;
to create each ping-pong Mallory sends only two short
(40B) packets. In the connection with S*, C tries to
download a 50MB file (similar to the previous experi-
ment). Lines 1 and 3 compare the file transfer time at
a normal time, to that when the Ack-Storm attack takes
place. This attack requires much less effort and lower
bandwidth than the Opt-Ack attack, i.e., has much higher
amplification ratio; but is limited by the client bandwidth
(which is typically lower than the server’s) this limita-
tion is illustrated by line 5 which is very similar to line 1
(normal conditions).
4 Server Sequence Number Exposure
In this and the following section we describe the se-
quence exposure attack where a off-path adversary,
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Figure 7: Evaluation of Ack-Strom and Opt-Ack DoS
attacks. The legend indicates for each line the type of
attack and the peers in the legitimate connection (that
Mallory aims to degrade). Measurements are the aver-
age of 50 runs, error-bars mark the standard deviations.
Mallory, learns the current sequence numbers of a TCP
connection between C and S.
We present a two phase attack: first, in this section we
describe how Mallory learns the server’s sequence num-
ber, sn, which S will use in the next packet sent to C.
In the second phase, presented in the following section,
we show how given S’s sequence number (sn), Mallory
efficiently obtains the acknowledgment number that C
expects; this acknowledgment number is the sequence
number that C will next use in packets sent to S. In both
phasesMallory communicates only withC and aids a side
channel feedback that she receives from C.
The attacks that we describe in both sections assumes
that Mallory had previously identified C and S’s IP ad-
dresses and ports; see details on how Mallory exposes
these parameters in Section 2.1.
4.1 The Server-Sequence Test
This subsection presents the server-sequence test that al-
lows Mallory to test whether some sequence number, sn,
is within the flow control window (wnd) that C keeps for
packets he receives from S. The key observation is that
when a connection is in the established state, the recipi-
ent’s handling of an empty acknowledgment packet (i.e.,
acknowledgment with no additional data) differs in case
that it is not within wnd. The difference depends on the
32-bit sequence number and allows Mallory to search for
a valid sequence number. The following paragraphs ex-
plain how:
Packets that specify an invalid sequence number (i.e.,
outside the recipient’s wnd) cause the recipient to send
a duplicate Ack (for the last valid packet the recipient
received). However, if the sequence number is within
wnd, then the receiver does not send any response; the
reason is that replying with an Ack in this case would
start a never-ending series of acknowledgments.
The server-sequence test, illustrated in Figure 8, has
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three steps: in the first and third steps Mallory sends a
query to C; this is some packet that causes C to send a
response packet back to Mallory who then saves the IP-
ID value in the response. In Section 6.1 we show how
Mallory can use the legitimate TCP connection she has
with C to implement queries and responses (since C is in
www.mallory.com). In the second step, Mallory sends C
a probe: this packet is spoofed and appears to belong to
C’s connection with S. The probe in this test is an empty
Ack packet that leverages the observation above.
When Mallory receives the responses (for steps 1,3);
she uses the IP-IDs they specify, i and j, to learn x= j− i,
the number of packets that C had sent between the two
queries. Since the Windows IP-ID implementation is a
single counter for all destinations (incremented on every
packet that C sends), Mallory learns that sn is within C’s
wnd if x = 1, i.e., C did not send any packet between the
two queries (see Figure 8).
Mallory C S
1. Query
2. Probe: Ack, src = S (spoofed) Seq = sn, no payload Respons
e, 
id = i
Duplicate 
Ack
3. Query
Respons
e,
id = j
Figure 8: Server-Sequence Test. The dashed arrow
marks the duplicate Ack that C sends S only in case that
sn is not within the flow control window. If sn is within
C’s wnd, then C does not send that packet and j− i = 1.
4.2 Learning Process
The probability that a sequence number that Mallory tests
is within C’s wnd is wnd-size232 (since wnd is 32 bits long);
this resembles to the TCP RST forgery attack [43] where
the attacker sends reset packets with arbitrary sequence
numbers. The value of wnd-size is therefore important;
Gont also points out the significance of the flow control
window size in his security assessment for TCP [20].
Mallory conducts the server-sequence test until he
identifies a sequence number within C’s wnd. Each test
is for a different sequence number which is of distance
ewnd from the previously tested one, where ewnd is an
estimation of C’s wnd-size. Namely, Mallory tests se-
quence numbers 0,ewnd,2ewnd, etc. Generally, if ewnd <
wnd-size, then Mallory would test redundant sequence
numbers, and if ewnd > wnd-size, then Mallory may not
find a valid sequence number. In our attacks (presented
in Sections 2, 3) we use the puppet to request some large
resource (or few small resources) over the connection
with S before initiating the sequence exposure attack; the
response increases C’s wnd-size. We increase wnd-size
until it is approximately 216. Once a sequence number
within wnd is detected, Mallory conducts a binary search
(over the possible ewnd sequence numbers) to identify
the exact beginning of wnd, which is the next server se-
quence number.
In Section 6 we provide an empirical evaluation of the
complete sequence exposure technique.
5 Client Sequence Number Exposure
In recent Windows client versions (from XP SP2 and on-
wards) the recipient uses the acknowledgment number,
that is specified within TCP packets, together with the
sequence number to verify that a packet is valid. In order
to inject a packet to the TCP stream, Mallory must spec-
ify an Ack number that is within C’s transmission win-
dow; i.e., Ack for new data that C had sent. The black
area in Figure 9 represents the ‘acceptable’ acknowledg-
ment numbers (transmission window). In this section we
show how to take advantage of Ack number validation to
expose the client’s sequence number.
5.1 The Client-Sequence Test
Similarly to the test we presented in the previous section,
we build a three step client-sequence test where the first
and last steps provide Mallory with the current value of
C’s IP-ID. In the second step Mallory sends a spoofed
probe, C’s response to this probe depends on the Ack
number Mallory specifies.
The test is derived from another observation from the
TCP specification [36] (Section 3.9, page 72). The rele-
vant statement refers to an acknowledgment packet that
carries data and contains a valid sequence number; i.e.,
success in the previous server sequence exposing phase
is required to initiate this phase. The specification dis-
tinguishes between two cases regarding the acknowledg-
ment number in the packet, see illustration in Figure 9.
Case 1: the packet contains a duplicate Ack (gray area
in Figure 9), or acknowledges data that was sent, but not
already acknowledged (black area in Figure 9). In this
case the recipient is supposed to continue processing the
packet regularly (see [36]). However, a Windows recip-
ient (e.g., C) silently discards the packet if it is in the
gray area (since acknowledgment is invalid); otherwise
(black area) its data is copied to the received buffer for
the application.
Case 2: In the complementary case that the acknowl-
edgment number is for data that was not yet sent (white
area in Figure 9), the recipient discards the segment and
immediately sends a duplicate Ack that specifies his cur-
rent sequence number, NXT.
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Figure 9: Ack Number Map. UNA is the lowest unac-
knowledged sequence number, NXT is the next sequence
number that C will send. Acknowledgments for data
in the gray area are considered duplicates, acknowledg-
ments for data in the white area are for unsent data, i.e.,
invalid. In the black area are sequence numbers for sent
un-Acked data. Note that the 32-bit Ack field is cyclic.
Hence, when C receives an acknowledgment packet
that specifies an acceptable sequence number, i.e., within
his flow control window (wnd), then: (1) in case that the
specified Ack number is after UNA, C sends an acknowl-
edgment; either since data had arrived (black area), or
since the packet acknowledges unsent data (white area).
(2) In case that the Ack number is before UNA (gray
area), then C (running Windows) discards it.
The probe which we use in the client sequence test
specifies the acknowledgment number to be tested (an)
and has two important properties: (1) the probe packet
specifies sn, a sequence number that is within C’s wnd
(discovered in the server sequence exposing phase); (2)
the probe packet specifies data.
Mallory C S
1. Query2. Probe: Ack = an, src = S (spoofed) 
Seq = sn, payload = "data" Resp
onse, 
id = i
Duplicate 
Ack
3. Query
Respons
e,
id = j
Figure 10: Client-Sequence Test. The dashed arrow
marks the duplicate Ack that C sends S in case that an
is in the white area in Figure 9. If j− i = 1, then C did
not send that packet; in this case Mallory identifies that
an is below UNA (i.e., in the gray area in Figure 9).
5.2 Ack Number Binary Search
The client-sequence test allows Mallory to conduct a bi-
nary search for the acknowledgment number that the
client expects. If the client-sequence test for the ac-
knowledgment number an indicates that C did not send
any packet between the two queries, then an is before
UNA (in the gray area in Figure 9). Otherwise, Mallory
concludes that an is after UNA (in the black or white area
in Figure 9).
The gray and white areas in Figure 9 are of equal size,
and the black area (sent bytes without acknowledgment)
is usually relatively small. This allows Mallory to per-
form a binary search for UNA; each time eliminating ap-
proximately half the possible numbers. The 32-bit length
of the Ack field (32 bits) implies that there are 32 itera-
tions.
6 Sequence Exposure in Practice
In this section we discuss the applicability of the se-
quence exposure technique in practice; we assume the
model presented in Section 1.
6.1 Implementing Test Queries/Responses
The server and client sequence tests we described in Sec-
tions 4 and 5 use packets that Mallory receives from C to
learn the effect of the (spoofed) probe packet. Mallory
can persuade C to send her such packets by using the le-
gitimate TCP connection she has with C: a query is some
short data packet that Mallory sends to C, the response is
the C’s acknowledgment sent back to Mallory.
This method allows Mallory to bypass typical firewall
defenses since all packets in the test appear to belong
to legitimate connections (requests to C-Mallory connec-
tion, probe to C-S connection). Specifically, Windows
Firewall does not filter this technique.
6.2 Detecting Packet Loss
In order to succeed in sequence exposing, Mallory must
identify when test packets are lost since the correspond-
ing test will yield a wrong result. For instance, if a probe
is lost, then its test will indicate that C respond to the
probe and mislead Mallory.
Mallory detects a lost probe by repeating tests that
indicate the client did not send a response (i.e., when
j− i= 1). There should be only few such tests: one when
probing for the server’s sequence number and about six-
teen during the binary search for the client sequence.
Mallory detects lost queries and responses by employ-
ing TCP congestion control. Since we implement the
queries as data sent on a TCP connection, we are able to
detect a lost query similarly to TCP congestion control
mechanism: if Mallory receives several duplicate Acks,
then she assumes that the corresponding query (a data
packet) was lost. In this case Mallory repeats all the tests
that she performed between the corrupt test and until its
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detection. Mallory detects a lost response by identifying
that no Ack was received for one of the queries (instead
an accumulative Ack was received); in this case she just
repeats the invalid test.
6.3 Test Errors
The sequence exposure process uses the global IP-ID to
determine whether a probe caused Cto respond. How-
ever, since every packet that C sends increments the IP-
ID, errors may occur.
Such errors can appear only in tests where C does not
respond to the probe: if C sends a packet in response to
the probe, then the IP-ID is incremented, and the differ-
ence in IP-ID values of the responses that Mallory sees is
at least 2; i.e., in this case Mallory always concludes that
C had sent a packet 2.
Hence, there are only few tests where an error is pos-
sible: during server sequence exposure only one test
should indicate that no packet was sent, i.e., that Mallory
found a sequence within the recipient flow control win-
dow. Mallory then conducts a binary search over the val-
ues in the flow control window to find the exact sequence
number. There are approximately 16 iterations to this bi-
nary search, on average, half of these indicate that C does
not send a packet in response to the probe. Similarly, the
binary search for the client-sequence includes 32 itera-
tions, on average 16 tests should indicate the C did not
send a packet.
6.4 Experiments
In this set of measurements we evaluate the sequence ex-
posure technique; in Sections 2 and 3 we evaluate the
full attack (that requires sequence exposing and different
successful ‘meaningful’ injections). The server in these
measurements is runs Apache, and the client is an up
to date Windows machine (protected by Windows Fire-
wall).
Figure 11 illustrates the success probability for dif-
ferent packets per second averages and when the pup-
pet runs on different browsers. The average time for a
successful sequence exposure is 102 seconds (standard
deviation 18 seconds); this is the estimated time we re-
quire the client to stay in the attacker’s site to conduct
cross site scripting and initiate denial of service attacks
(see Sections 2 and 3) 3. Attacker and client bandwidths
are respectively 1 and 10 mbps.
2We assume that Mallory can send these packets with (small) inter-
packet delay, such that reordering in the test packets is a rare.
3The web spoofing attack presented in Section 2.4 requires that the
victim will stay in the attacker’s site until he accesses the web-page that
attacker wishes to spoof.
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Figure 11: TCP sequence exposure success rate. Each
measurement is the average of 50 runs, error bars mark
standard deviations.
In appendix A we provide a detailed comparison be-
tween our sequence exposure technique to the one previ-
ously presented in [27].
7 Defense Mechanisms
The attacks in this paper relay on successful exposure
of the sequence numbers, the technique we presented
for this task uses the global counter property of the IP-
ID implementation in Windows machines. Deployment
of IPv6 mitigates the IP-ID attack vector since the IPv6
fragmentation header (that specifies the IP-ID) is only
present in fragmented packets. In most implementa-
tions, TCP employs path MTU discovery to avoid IP-
fragmentation. Hence, TCP connections over IPv6 are
usually immune to our attacks.
In this section we propose defenses that prevent off-
path sequence exposing. Our mechanisms are of two
types, those deployed at the client-end, and those at the
server-end. Each mechanism blocks the attack even if
the other side is unprotected; i.e., servers and clients can
independently protect themselves.
7.1 Server-End Defense
The defense at the server end uses feedback that the
client machine (that runs the puppet) involuntarily sends
as a side effect of the ID-exposing process. For every
wrong guess of the server sequence number, the client
sends the server a duplicate Ack (see section 4 and Fig-
ure 8). We monitor the acknowledgments that the server
receives to detect the attack. The following two firewall
rules provide indications of an ongoing sequence expo-
sure attempt.
The first rule verifies that in no point in time the server
receives more Ack packets than the number of un-Acked
data packets that he had sent to the client. However, the
adversary can trick this rule by using the puppet to re-
quest some data from the server, the short window of un-
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Acked packets (‘in transit’) allows testing few sequence
numbers.
We can further improve detection of the sequence ex-
posure attack for connections that employ the TCP se-
lective Ack option. This option is used by most mod-
ern browsers, including Internet explorer, Firefox and
Chrome. A selective Ack specifies the sequence numbers
of out-of-order data that was received by the sender and
allows to distinguish between a duplicate Ack generated
by a network loss and a duplicate Ack due to sequence
exposure attempt.
The second rule is enabled when the selective Ack op-
tion is used; it verifies that no two sequential Ack packets
that the server receives are identical. Normally, a dupli-
cate Ack is a result of a packet, p, that arrives out-of-
order. In this typical case, p’s sequence number must
still be in the recipient’s flow control window; hence, p’s
data is queued and the recipient sends a duplicate Ack
to the source. The selective Ack attached to this feed-
back notifies that p’s data was received. However, in the
case of a sequence exposure attack, most of the probes
that the attacker sends are out of the recipient’s (client’s)
flow control window and are discarded. Therefore, the
duplicate Ack response to a probe is identical to the pre-
vious Ack that the server had received.
After several indications of an attack, the firewall tears
down the connection. Note that abuse of this mechanism
to cause the server to close a legitimate connection with
one of his clients requires the adversary to send to the
client a probe that specifies the correct connection four
tuple. However, since in contrast to our attacks, the off-
path attacker does not create the legitimate connection
(that she tries to tear down), it is challenging to expose
the connection parameters (addresses and ports).
7.2 Client-End Defense
In this subsection we propose modifying the IPv4 identi-
fier at the client’s firewall (to replace the global counter).
Since the identifier is only used by the recipient to match
packet fragments, when a packet arrives at the sender’s
firewall, it can modify the IP-ID field without any im-
plications on the sender or recipient (even if the packet
will be fragmented later on the route). When a packet
arrives in fragments at the firewall, then it must map all
fragments of the same packet (those that specify the same
reassembly four tuple - IP addresses, protocol and IP-ID)
to the same identifier.
The first, intuitively appealing direction seems to be
using random identifiers. However in IPv4 this is not
recommended, according to the birthday paradox, in
roughly 1.2
√
216 =
⌈
1.2 ·28⌉= 307 packets there will be
a repetition (since the field is 16 bits long), which would
cause fragments of one packet to be mis-associated with
others, and hence cripple performance.
The IP standards [35, 11] specify that IP fragments are
associated with a packet according to four parameters:
source and destination addresses, transport layer proto-
col (e.g., TCP), and identifier. Therefore, a simple solu-
tion would be that each source, destination, protocol tu-
ple will be associated with a different identifier counter,
initialized by a keyed pseudo random function f , i.e., the
initial identifier is fk(source, dest, protocol). In Linux,
the choice of IP-ID is similar, but is only based on the
source and destination addresses.
FreeBSD supports using random IPv4 IDs which are
permuted locally: a packet is assigned with a random
IP-ID that was not specified in one of the recent (8192)
packets that were sent 4. Both Linux and FreeBSD ap-
proaches immune the TCP connection to our attacks.
8 Conclusions
In this work, we show that the folklore belief that TCP
is secure against spoofing-only, off-path attackers is un-
founded. We show practical, realistic injection attacks.
We further show that this allows crucial abuses, breaking
the same-origin policy defense which is critical to web
security, and allowing devastating DoS attacks.
One important conclusion is that Bellovin [10] was
right: TCP was never designed for security, and should
not be expected to provide it. To ensure authentica-
tion and confidentiality, even against (only) spoofers, we
should use secure protocols such as SSL/TLS [12] or
IPsec [23]. SSL/TLS may not suffice to prevent (lower-
layer) attacks such as the DoS attacks presented in this
paper (Section 3); to prevent these too, we should use
lower-layer security mechanisms, preferably IPsec or
other mechanisms, e.g., see [42, 16].
A potentially more controversial conclusion is that ba-
sic vulnerabilities should be investigated and fixed, even
before demonstration of a complete, practical, exploit. In
this paper, we went into great length to prove the practi-
cality of the vulnerability, since earlier results were con-
sidered as ‘impractical’. We believe that the network
security community should adopt a more prudent ap-
proach, publishing and addressing issues and potential
vulnerabilities, without waiting for a complete exploit.
Compare the approach in the cryptographic community,
where even yet-theoretical attacks are taken into account,
published and motivate design of improved ciphers.
4The default FreeBSD configuration uses a globally incrementing
IP-ID, as in Windows.
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A Comparing Performance of TCP Injec-
tion Attacks
In this appendix we compare the existing approach and
technique for TCP injection presented in [27] to those
presented in this paper. The significant difference be-
tween the two approaches is that [27] injects data to a
legitimate existing connection between two peers (C and
S) where in this paper we use a puppet to create the vic-
tim connection. This difference has three implications
we describe below.
First, the attacker must identify the connection be-
tween C and S and expose its parameters (IP addresses
and ports). In [27] attacker is assumed to have previous
knowledge of the client and server addresses as well as
the server’s port; in this paper we assume only knowl-
edge of the server’s address and port which are usually
available. In order to expose the client’s port, in [27]
the attacker performs a variant of the idle scan, indirectly
scanning all possible client ports. The scan is as follows:
the attacker sends a SYN to the server spoofed as if from
the client; if there is already a connection through the
client port specified in the SYN packet, then the server
ignores the spoofed SYN. Otherwise the server sends a
SYN/ACK packet to the client who will respond in RST.
The attacker uses the global IP-ID to test whether the
client sent a packet in response.
Implementing this method for probing the client port
has a few challenges: (a) this technique is filtered by typi-
cal client firewalls (e.g., Windows Firewall) that will dis-
card the SYN/ACK server response in case that the client
did not first send a SYN. (b) attacker must run a synchro-
nized attack, querying for the client IP-ID, then assume
that the server probe had arrived and query for the IP-
ID again; if during this time C sends a packet or server
SYN/ACK does not yet arrive then the test is invalid.
In contrast, we create the connection using the puppet
and identify the client port by using an insight on Win-
dows port allocation paradigm. This allows us to form
a connection with an ‘interesting’ server and efficiently
detect its parameters (see Section 2.1).
Second, the attacker in [27] must cope ongoing traffic
over the victim connection itself. Such traffic fails the bi-
nary search for the client sequence number (see Section
5) since this phase requires specifying a valid sequence
number (which keeps changing due to traffic on the con-
nection). Moreover, [27] does not describe how to im-
plement the queries to (1) avoid firewall filtering and (2)
detect network losses. In the approach presented in this
paper, the attacker controls the connection since her pup-
pet makes the requests for the server. Hence she is able
to avoid traffic on the connection while exposing the se-
quence numbers. The legitimate TCP connection with
the client is used to implement the queries (see details in
Section 6).
In Figure 12 we compare the success rates of our at-
tack to that described in [27] where the victim connection
in while running the attack in [27] has only a modest 10
kbps traffic rate (since attacker does not control the traffic
rate in this case). The comparison is for different network
delays between the client and attacker; the longer the de-
lay, the more time until the attacker receives feedback
and the more traffic that passes on the connection. Since
[27] does not specify how to implement the queries, we
used our method, i.e., on a TCP connection between the
client and the attacker. We assume that the attacker in
[27] successfully detects the client port (despite the chal-
lenges above). We also assume that the client sends an
average of 32 packets per second to other peers.
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Figure 12: Comparison of sequence exposure tech-
niques. Each measurement is the average of 50 runs,
error bars mark standard deviations.
The third difference between our approach to [27] re-
gards to the practical challenge of performing a ‘mean-
ingful’ injection. That is, after a successful exposure of
sequence numbers, the attacker should identify the right
time to inject his data; For example, to perform the XSS
attack, the spoofed response must arrive after the client
had sent a request; it is hard for an off-path attacker to
detect that time. In contrast, the attacks in this initiate
the request using the puppet and inject the response (see
Section 2).
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